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with them. .I. Introduction
It seems relatively easy to explain why developing countries
(DCs) increasingly appeared on international capital markets
in the last decade. Frequently, reference is made to the un-
favourable economic environment in the seventies and early
eighties, characterized by oil price hikes, a slackening world
market demand and extremely high international interest rates.
However, in order to explain widespread difficulties of DCs in
servicing their external debt it is far from sufficient to
refer to negative external shocks. The observation that some
DCs declared default, notwithstanding that they did not unduly
suffer from external shocks, whereas others (some of which
remained creditworthy) were severely hit, strongly points to
the importance of domestic economic policies in managing ad-
justment burdens and preventing debt crises. It was shown
elsewhere that most Asian borrowers did significantly better
in adjusting their economies to the unfavourable economic
environment than Latin American countries (Campbell, 1982a;
Nunnehkamp, 1985b). Thus without considering effective policy
re-orientations especially in today's problem countries it is
impossible to formulate lasting solutions to the ongoing dif-
ficii'l'tdes in servicing foreign debt.
The rise in 'foreign indebtedness of DCs might have been sub-
stantially narrowed if international commercial banks had
refused to meet the Third World's mounting demand for foreign
funds. That is why the emergence of debt problems was not the
sole responsibility of borrowers. The central hypothesis of
this paper is thus that current problems could have been miti-
gated by more prudent lending policies ,of the banks.
Data limitations and the lack of a comprehensive and empiri-
cally testable theory of bank behaviour makes it rather diffi-
cult to subject this hypothesis to high-powered methods. What
Paper presented at the Asia Pacific Bankers Club Symposium,
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can be done instead is to analyse a set of plausible arguments
which may shed some light on bank lending to the Third World.
This is the approach taken in this paper (Section III), after
presenting a short overview of the extent and some major char-
acteristics of credit-relations between Western commercial
banks and the DCs. Particularly the questions will be raised
whether banks followed a lemming-like behaviour in lending to
DCs, whether they were subject to risk-illusions or even could
discount the risks involved because of incentives to moral
hazard.
As is well-known, the Mexican debt crisis in mid-1982 marked a
milestone in banks' lending policies to DCs; the provision of
fresh loans was abruptly and drastically reduced. This turn-
about resulted in a restrictive policy that - according to
widespread belief -, macroeconomically is no less harmful than
the expansive behaviour until the early eighties. Sometimes it
is argued, that the commercial banks can or will no longer
play their role in channelling a sufficient amount of finan-
cial resources to the Third World. Accordingly, official cre-
ditors, both national and international, are asked to step in
and close the perceived gap. This reasoning will be critically
analysed in Section IV. Additionally the most important ele-
ments of a comprehensive solution to the ongoing debt problems
will be presented, with particular emphasis on the interplay
between public authorities and private creditors.
II. Bank Lending to Developing Countries: Some Major Charac-
teristics
In mid-1984 gross long- and short-term debt of non-oil devel-
oping countries (NOPECs; for a definition, see note 3 in Table
1) vis-a-vis banks reporting to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) stood at $ 265 billion (Table 1) . Within a
decade gross figures had soared about eightfold, until 1982 by



















































































































































































Interbank lending included. - Group of Ten countries plus Luxemburg, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland and Austria; 1984:
Finland, Norway and Spain additionally. - Excluded are: OPEC member countries, Bahrain, Brunei, Oman, Trinidad and
Tobago and developing countries classified as offshore banking centres. The sum of figures for the three regions does
not add up to the totals for all NOPECs because figures for the less important NOPECs located in the Middle East are not
presented here. - Gross: total (short- and long-term) assets of BIS reporting banks, in domestic and foreign currency,
vis-a-vis borrowing country groups; net: gross figures minus total liabilities of banks vis-a-vis country groups. -
End of June.
Source: BIS, International Banking Developments; BIS, Annual Report.- 4 -
growth in total international claims of BIS reporting banks of
21 per cent. In the same period overall external debt of
NOPECs against official and private creditors increased by 19
per cent per annum, finally reaching $ 710 billion in 1984. In
other words, growth in bank lending to NOPECs significantly
outpaced the extension of both bank loans to other borrowers
and credits to NOPECs from other - i.e. mainly official -
sources . As a share in NOPECs
1 overall long-term external
liabilities, private financial institutions accounted for
35-40 per cent in the most recent past, against only 15.5 per
cent in 1973 (IMF, World Economic Outlook). Netting out bor-
rowing countries' deposits placed with BIS reporting banks,
the NOPECs formed by far the largest debtor group. In the
early eighties banks' net claims on them exceeded $ 140 bil-
lion, whereas other net borrowing country groups (i.e. the
developed economies outside the BIS reporting area and the
Eastern European countries) owed only $ 67 and $ 30 billion in
1983, respectively, on a net basis.
However, it is not only the huge amount of NOPECs
1 bank debt
or the considerable growth in liabilities that may cause con-
cern. With respect to the analysis of bank behaviour and the
discussion of possible solutions to present debt problems in
the next sections, it is primarily the following characteris-
tics of credit-relations between the Third World and Western
commercial banks which need to be stressed. First it should be
noted, that a significant part of the DCs
1 bank debt has been
raised via syndicated bank loans. This seems important as it
will be argued later, that the remarkable spreading of loan
syndications gave an impetus to imprudent lending. According
to Table 2, NOPECs absorbed a rising share of capital avail-
able in the medium- and long-term Euro-currency market for
syndicated credits on a floating interest rate basis. Whereas
The growing importance of bank lending is of course not
evenly spread across the NOPECs. For the significant
differences as regards the role of private creditors in
Asian DCs, see Campbell (1982a).- 5 -
Table 2 - International Medium- and Long-Term Bank Loans by Borrowing Country






























































































Included are also Bahrain, Oman and Trinidad and Tobago. - Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire. - Ac-
cording to the analysis presented in Nunnenkamp (1985a), the following countries
are regarded as major problem borrowers: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Tur-
4
key, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. - Estimates on the basis of data for Jan-
uary to November.
Source: OECD, Financial Statistics. .- 6 -
at the beginning of the period under consideration roughly a
quarter of loans were raised by NOPECs, their share climbed to
an average of 38 per cent in 1975-80. Gross lending of NOPECs
amounted to $ 117 billion in this latter period. In the early
eighties another $ 98 billion were borrowed.
A second critical aspect of bank lending to DCs can be seen in
the widespread use of public guarantees, which may result in
risk illusions on the creditors' side and, accordingly, induce
too expansive lending policies and badly diversified credit
portfolios (Lessard, 1983) . Already in the first half of the
seventies more than 50 per cent of NOPECs
1 long-term debt from
private sources were publicly guaranteed by borrower govern-
ments. This share was further raised to about 70 per cent in
the most recent past (IMF, World Economic Outlook). Especially
private financial institutions were the beneficiaries of the
intensified use of official guarantees. In absolute amounts,
their claims on NOPECs bearing a public guaranty exploded from
only $ 17.3 billion in 1973 to $ 210 and $ 243 billion in 1983
and 1984, respectively.
A third characteristic of bank lending to the Third World
which must be emphasized is the extremely high concentration
of claims on a rather small number of borrowing countries.
Table 1 indicates that, on a gross basis, the share of Latin
American NOPECs in all NOPECs
1 bank liabilities steadily ex-
ceeded 65 per cent. Adjusted for DCs
1 deposits, the exposure
of commercial banks in different Third World regions was even
more unbalanced. In Africa - where already gross figures re-
mained negligible - and particularly in Asia, gross debt due
to banks was largely matched by deposits. Consequently, Latin
America accounted for more than 90 per cent of the banks' net
assets vis-a-vis all NOPECs. In the mid-seventies the five
most important Latin American problem countries (Venezuela and
the four NOPECs Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico) held about
40 per cent of BIS reporting banks' gross claims on all DCs
(OPEC countries included). This concentration further in-
creased and exceeded 50 per cent in the early eighties (BIS,- 7 -
International Banking Developments) .
The concentration of bank lending to only a few heavily in-
debted DCs has as a consequence that banks are vulnerable to
the inability or unwillingness of these borrowers to service
their external debt. Because of fears according to which bank
failures may even result-in critical tensions in the worldwide
financial system, it is frequently argued that public author-
ities in creditor countries must be prepared to implement
quick rescue programs for banks threatened by .default. This
reasoning will be critically discussed in the following sec-
tions. It can be hardly denied, however, that - without offi-
cial bail-outs - those banks heavily engaged in the most im-
portant problem countries may run into considerable difficul-
ties, if these borrowers fail to fulfill their debt obliga-
tions for long. Table 3 portrays the fourth crucial aspect of
bank lending to the Third World by taking the US-banks as an
2
example . Relative to US-banks' capital base, claims on all
NOPECs averaged 130 per cent in 1977-84. The ratio was consid-
erably higher for the nine largest US-banks, amounting to an
average of 195 per cent. In both cases, the exposure to only
Brazil and Mexico accounted for more than 40 per cent of fig-
ures for all NOPECs. Again the banks' exposure to the most
heavily indebted countries (as also to all NOPECs) still in-
creased during the late seventies and the early eighties.
Taking the five major Latin American problem borrowers togeth-
er, the claims of selected US-banks relative to their capital
reached 140-260 per cent in 1982. In some cases, loans to a
single borrowing country exceeded 70 per cent of the capital
paid-in.
In the latter period South Korea and the Philippines - the
two most important Asian DC-borrowers in international cap-
ital markets - together accounted for 8 per cent of BIS
reporting banks' gross claims on all DCs.
2
Similar information for the commercial banks of other credi-
tor countries is unfortunately hardly available. However,
scattered evidence indicates, that also the largest German
and Britain banks are heavily exposed to credit risks in the
Third World, though apparently to a somewhat lesser extent
(Junge, Nunnenkamp, 1984; Johnson, 1,983).- 8 -
Table 3 - US-Bank Lending to Non-Oil Developing Countries Relative to Bank























































Manufactures 47.5 77.7 28.4 66.7 42.4 262.8
Hanover
Crocker National 38.1 57.3 26.5 51.2 22.8 196.0
Citibank 18.2 73.5 10.0 54.6 18.2 174.5
Chemical 14.9 52.0 14.8 60.0 28.0 169.7
Bank of America 10.2 47.9 6.3 52.1 41.7 158.2
Chase Manhattan 21.3 56.9 11.8 40.0 24.0 154.0
Bankers Trust 13.2 46.2 10.6 46.2 25.1 141.2
Morgan Guaranty 24.4 54.3 9.7 34.8 17.5 140.7
1End-1982. -
 2End of March.
Source; Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Country Exposure Lending Survey;
Cline, 1983.- 9 -
III. Imprudent Bank Behaviour until the Early Eighties?
The considerable growth of international bank lending to the
DCs in the last decade may be interpreted as the result of a
combination of supply and demand factors (Dennis, 1983;
Fleming, Howson, 1980). In this view it is often implicitly
assumed that the Western commercial banks merely reacted to
changed conditions in international financial markets rather
than taking the initiative themselves and actively striving
for intensified credit-relations with Third World borrowers.
The "traditional" argument runs as follows: After the first
steep rise in oil prices in 1973/74 most OPEC members were
unable to immediately spend total extra oil revenues for ad-
ditional imports. Searching for high-yielding financial in-
vestment opportunities abroad, they showed a strong reluctance
to channel the funds directly to oil-importing DCs. Instead
they turned to industrial countries and Western commercial
banks as an outlet for investment. The international banking
system reacted by accepting its role as financial intermedi-
ary. Since the demand for credits in recession-hit industrial
countries was weak, it was mainly the oil-importing DCs which
needed to finance balance of payments deficits. It was even
hypothesized, that the DCs
1 loan demand was only met by com-
mercial banks because these needed a substitute for the slack-
ening absorption of financial funds by the advanced economies
(Fleming, 1981).
I cannot believe that this is an adequate analysis of what had
happened after 1973. There are a number of observations that
point to a more active role of commercial banks in intensify-
ing credit-relations with DCs (see also Campbell, 1982a).
First of all it can be observed, that a stringently inverse
relationship between bank lending to industrialized economies
and NOPECs did not exist in the last decade. For sure, some-
times relatively small increases in banks
1 claims on non-NOPEC
borrowers went along with particularly large expansions of
NOPECs' bank liabilities (see Tables 1 and 2). This may indi-- 10
cate that a switching of funds by commercial banks from devel-
oped to developing countries has taken place in some years.
Regarding the period since 1973 as a whole, however, both rank
correlation and simple regression analyses cast doubts on the
relevance of the hypothesis of a generally inverse relation-
ship; neither of these procedures produced the expected nega-
tively signed coefficients (for further details, see Junge,
Nunnenkamp, 1984; Nunnenkamp, 1985a). Moreover, it is striking
that the expansion of overall claims of the BIS reporting
banks clearly outpaced the increase in their total liabilities
since 1973. This difference indicates ~that the commercial
banks
1 role in the recycling process cannot be adequately
characterized as a merely passive clearing-station between
OPEC-supply and NOPEC-demand. Rather their actively performed
lending policies resulted in a considerable "over-recycling"
(Schlesinger, 1984, p. 340).
Searching for factors that may have led to over-recycling by
commercial banks, a first hypothesis refers to the profit
motive of private creditors. When the slackening loan demand
in domestic markets threatened to reduce the banks' domestic
profitability, the relatively high return from international
lending provided an incentive for banks to strengthen their
foreign credit engagements. Although it is hardly possible to
conclusively evaluate the relative profitability of bank lend-
ing in different markets, scattered evidence speaks in favour
of this hypothesis:
- For the mid-seventies Porzecanski (1981) presented estimates
for the ten internationally most active US-banks, according
to which the return on domestic assets was significantly
outpaced by profit margins on international assets. More-
over, available evidence for US-banks pointed to particular-
ly high returns in lending to DCs (O'Brien, 1981; for fur-
ther details, see Salomon Brothers, 1980) .- 11 -
- In a worldwide survey asking bankers for their view on in-
ternational lending in the second half of the seventies, 50
per cent of all respondents said that it has been more prof-
itable than domestic lending (same as domestic: 27 per cent;
Group of Thirty, 1982a).
- The impression that relatively high returns in international
markets were largely due to bank lending to DCs is supported
by an analysis of the development of spreads. According to
World Bank data, the difference in spreads between DCs and
industrial countries reached 0.5 percentage points in the
late seventies (World Bank, Borrowing in International Cap-
ital Markets). This can hardly be attributed to higher loan
losses in lending to DCs: Major NOPECs tended to have a
proportionally (i.e. relative to banks' claims on them)
better loss record than, for example, Western European coun-
tries, when aggregating total loan charge-offs in 1975-79
for more than 100 US-banks (Robert Morris Associates; see
also Campbell, 1982b, p. 93) . Moreover, evidence presented
in Table 4 casts further doubts on the perception, that the
level of spreads was closely related to the risks involved.
Notwithstanding that risks in lending to DCs increased over
time, spreads were considerably lower in the early eighties
than in 1976-78. Accordingly, it may be concluded that at
least in the latter period market conditions promised bright
profit chances for banks; probably, this gave a strong impe-
tus to lending to DCs.
A second hypothesis that may lend further support to the just
presented reasoning, refers to the country risk analysis of
banks. The latter seems to bear part of the responsibility of
over-lending, notwithstanding that the banks' credit policies
were praised for long by most observers as economically sound
and well suited for guarantying a smooth recycling of petro-
dollars. Severe difficulties prevailed in adequately judging
risks, since the deficiencies of available indicator systems




























































































































Unweighted averages calculated from data for individual loans; in parentheses if the number of loans is less than four; "-"
2
if no loans are reported; for details of country classification, see Nunnenkamp, 1985a; Junge, Nunnenkamp, 1984. - In addi-
tion to borrowing countries listed in note 2 of Table 2, Cameroon, Morocco and Sudan were included. - Argentina, Brazil,
4
Chile, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. - Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast,
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.
Source; Euromoney Syndication Guide.dm
mMT3d
- 13 -
1974; Sachs, 1982) . Risk analysis was further complicated by
the growing importance of systematically correlated risks
among different borrowing countries. The two oil price hikes
contributed to a parallel deterioration in the terms-of-trade
of most NOPECs. Given increasingly coordinated macroeconomic
policies in industrial countries, national business cycles
were synchronized which, in turn, negatively affected exports
of DCs. The roll-over technique quickly transmitted the rise
in international interest rates to all those DCs with consid-
erable bank debts. It is thus extremely dubious that "the lack
of structural uniformity of the countries within the OIDC
(oil-importing developing country) category ensures that lend-
ing risk is well diversified" (Fleming, 1981, p. 31). The
rapid expansion of bank lending to DCs up to the recent past
rather suggests, that systematically correlated risks have
been overlooked or at least underrated.
Besides these practical hindrances in carefully assessing
risks, it may be further questioned that the banks
1 lending
decisions have been prudent and that later difficulties have
exclusively arisen from unforeseeable developments (Williams
et al., 1982). The lack of reliable information should have
led banks to a rather cautious treatment of DCs
1 loan demands.
It thus seems justified to consider additional influences
which may have induced an imprudently expansive lending
(Glismann, Nunnenkamp, 1983) .
- A discounting of risks has been due to motivational struc-
tures in internal decision-making of banks. In the seventies
loan-marketing officers seem to have aimed at maximizing
loan approvals to the country or region they were concerned
with, because annual bonuses and career prospects were at
For the failure of country rating systems, see Institutional
Investor Magazine. To mention just one example: the credit
rating of Mexico deteriorated significantly only after the
acute crisis was there.- 14 -
stake (Palmer et al., 1983). Accordingly, incentives existed
to stress favourable aspects of further lending and suppress
objections to it. In cases like Mexico, an impressive raw
material endowment was regarded as sufficient collateral,
without taking into account whether it was used efficiently
and productively (Group of Thirty, 1982b).
- In other cases, risk considerations have been overruled by
political pressures. In the above mentioned survey by the
Group of Thirty about 25 per cent of bankers responded, that
loan decisions have been considerably influenced by govern-
ments in creditor countries.
Additionally, a number of innovations in international financ-
ing techniques may have induced imprudent bank lending. Men-
tion should be made of the use of roll-over credits and loan
syndications on a large scale. Although, in principle, these
techniques seemed well suited to improve risk-sharing both
among banks and between banks and borrowers, this was only one
face of the coin. A cumulation of faults might have been the
dark side which was overlooked until recently.
The syndication process permitted even smaller creditors to
participate in international lending, whereas previously they
were predominantly concerned with lending in domestic markets.
Because of a lack of experience and expertise, many small new-
comers heavily relied on judgements of major banks arranging
syndications (de Grauwe, Fratianni, 1983; Goodman, 1983) .
According to the survey, by the Group of Thirty, 36 per cent of
smaller banks regarded it as appropriate to rely on country
risk assessments by syndicate leaders etc.. Independent deci-
sion-making of individual creditors was at least partly ruled
out; this may have contributed to a lemming-like behaviour in
international banking (Guttentag, Herring, 1984).- 15 -
This line of argumentation would seem to be supported by em-
pirical findings, showing that a high correlation between the
debtor country structure of international bank portfolios of
different banking groups exists. We have shown elsewere that
all groups concentrated on a similar set of borrowers, irre-
spective of the measure chosen for ranking (absolute assets
vis-a-vis borrowing countries, growth rates of assets or as-
sets relative to the borrowing countries' exports, for ex-
ample; for details, see Jurige, Nunnenkamp, 1984) . This holds
for different groups of US-banks, classified according to
their size (Federal Reserve Board, var. iss.), as well as for
banks of different creditor nations (US, UK, West Germany),
though at somewhat different levels of statistical signifi-
cance.
Also for large banks the syndication process produced incen-
tives to over-lending. Especially for syndicate leaders and
managing banks high fee incomes were at stake, which increased
parallel to the amount of loans provided. In the US it was
common practice to treat major portions of loan fees immedi-
ately as income, i.e. during the quarter or year in which the
loan was made (Weintraub, 1983) . This accounting practice is
likely to have induced short-term income maximization of banks
at the expense of a comprehensive risk assessment.
Also the technique of rolling over short-term credits is sup-
posed to have contributed to a discounting of risks by commer-
cial banks. In this way the refunding risk of banks' as well as
the risk of rising interest rates was largely shifted to the
borrower. Apparently, the creditors were on the safe side, a
feeling which was strengthened by the fact that the bulk of
credits was raised by DC governments or at least officially
guaranteed by the debtors' governments. The assumption that DC
governments would pick up the bill in case of failing proj-
ects, forms another reason why the amount of loans granted to
DCs can be expected to have exceeded lending under conditions
of undistorted risk-consciousness of banks. In lending to DCs,- 16 -
the banks' control of how their money was used seemed often
less strict than in domestic business.
Only recently, when many DCs could no longer manage rising
debt service burdens, were risk illusions of creditors frus-
trated. However, even when the banks' confidence in borrowing
countries' guarantees proved to be unsolid, a second line of
defence existed against massive losses out of lending to DCs.
According to the moral hazard hypothesis, risks in interna-
tional lending not only were disregarded, but could even be
disregarded without harm and needed not to be properly ana-
lysed. This is due to the widespread view that banks should be
officially bailed out in a critical situation threatening
their economic well-being, in order to prevent overall econom-
ic conditions from being negatively affected. The reliance on
both domestic central banks and international organizations
like the IMF, which were supposed to step in as lenders-of-
last-resort if commercial banks ran into troubles., is likely
to have further reduced the risk-consciousness of private
lenders (Sjaastad, 1983). A second argument along these lines
refers to moral hazard resulting from insurance schemes for
bank depositors. Because depositors feel safeguarded against
losses, they face insufficient incentives to critically review
the banks' policies and to react by withdrawing their deposits
if they consider lending decisions to be unsound. "Deposit
insurance . . . spares most depositors the cost of learning
about the operation of banks. But, as a consequence, deposit
insurance frees banks from the discipline and cost of those
depositors' concerns" (Benston, 1983, pp. 7-8).
Experience in the recent past confirmed the banks' confidence
in official support in case of DCs facing major difficulties
in servicing their bank debt. In 1974 the central bank gover-
nors of the Group of Ten countries and Switzerland issued a
communique, after having discussed the problem of the lender-
of-last-resort in Euro-markets, that said: "They [the gover-
nors] recognized that it would not be practical to lay down in- 17 -
advance detailed rules and procedures for the provision of
temporary liquidity. But they were satisfied that means are
available for that purpose and will be used if and when neces-
sary" (cited in Wallich, 1977, p. 95). This statement may have
induced moral hazard since it confuses two different problems:
the insolvency of individual banks and an overall liquidity
shortage. Actually, in the early eighties the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, acting on behalf of central banks of
Group of Ten countries, provided bridging finance in several
instances. Moreover, the IMF arranged many rescheduling pro-
grams and made available considerable amounts of official
credits for debt problem-ridden developing countries. Although
official lending was made conditional on further loans provid-
ed by private debtors, it seems likely that the IMF and other
official activities were welcomed by banks because they got a
chance to transfer their own risks at least partly to official
agencies (Vaubel, 1983).
To sum up, it seems plausible to attribute continued bank
lending to already over-indebted DCs at least partly to moral
hazard, rather than to persistent hopes of only temporary re-
payment difficulties of borrowers. This behaviour was merely
rational from the banks' point of view. The conditions for a
socialization of private losses seem to have improved recent-
ly, as reflected by a review of major proposals presently
discussed to alleviate the critical debt situation of DCs.
Many of them argue for shifting the adjustment burden to the
taxpayer (for an overview, see Campbell, 1982b; Junge,
Nunnenkamp, 1984; Nunnenkamp, 1985a).
IV. Possible Solutions to the Debt Dilemma
The observation that the acute debt crises of 1982-83, espe-
cially in Latin American countries, have driven many banks to
cut the expansion of their credit engagement in the Third
World drastically, is commonly regarded as a dramatic shift in- 18 -
private creditors' policies towards DCs. After having more or
less successfully dealt with the immediate task of short-term
rescheduling, the present situation of highly exposed banks
which are reluctant to continue or resume lending has caused
new alarm. Actually, we may face, a severe dilemma in the com-
ing years. If the persistent demands for fresh money by major
problem borrowers are not met, this may rather add to the
instability of the worldwide financial system (Campbell,
1982b). Borrowing countries that cannot afford negative net
transfers for several years, may be forced to declare default,
thereby precipitating massive write-offs in the creditors'
balance sheets, which in turn may result in severe bank
crises.
This bleak scenario has provoked a whole series of proposals
as to how to fill the perceived financial gap. Although most
suggestions address only specific aspects of the debt issue,
due consideration should be given to those proposals which may
help to diversify the capital import structure of DCs and to
raise the internal economic resources in borrowing countries
for servicing their external debt. In this context the conver-
sion of loan claims of Western commercial banks into equity
shares in the productive resources of borrowers (public and
private enterprises in DCs) should be mentioned (Meltzer,.
1983).
However, it remains questionable whether a diversification in
financial instruments would increase the flow of private funds
to the Third World to a great extent. That is why many observ-
ers advocate a stronger engagement of public creditors, both
national and international (see, for example, Cuddy, 1983).
This is intended to serve two purposes: On the one hand it
should help to restore the financial equilibrium in external
balances of DCs. On the other hand this suggestion is fre-
quently meant to take part of adjustment burdens off the
shoulders of Western commercial banks and shift it to the
public. The most popular way of socializing private bank risks- 19 -
or losses would be to officially acquire bank credits at no or
only small discount (for an overview on different variants of
this approach, see Bogdanowicz-Bindert, 1983).
Two major arguments must be raised against the proponents of
tackling ongoing debt difficulties by mobilizing public funds
for problem-ridden DCs and commercial banks. Provided that the
overall amount of development assistance will continue to grow
only modestly, public funds cannot compensate for bank credits
to a significant extent without strongly interfering with
traditional motivations for public aid. Moreover, if problem
borrowers would receive subsidized credits at the expense of
sound debtors, a severe moral hazard problem arises. The lat-
ter countries would be discouraged from following policies
that seem well suited to prevent major difficulties in debt
servicing, i.e. further problem cases would be invited. As
concerns the commercial banks, the proposed strategy of public
assistance would again result in moral hazard problems, as
private creditors might be encouraged to carelessly repeat
imprudent lending.
Accordingly, other ways of solving debt problems have to be
found. Two targets have to be met: 1. to assure the stability
of the international financial and economic system and 2. to
restore a sufficient flow of private funds to DCs on a volun-
tary basis. Quite obviously, any attempt to meet these targets
has to be rather comprehensive thereby combining different
elements, each of which addresses specific underlying factors
of the present debt situation. It thus seems adequate to
shortly point to a few important conditions for a lasting
solution of ongoing problems, before considering in some more
detail the interplay between public authorities and private
creditors.
-First of all, the crisis management characterized by the
reschedulings in the early eighties has to be revised. Sta-
bilization programs should not primarily aim at short-term- 20 -
improvements in the balance of payments position of borrow-
ing countries. Especially drastic and global import cuts may
severely impede a sustainable adjustment of external bal-
ances in the longer run. This requires the IMF to abandon
its emphasis on short-term therapies and instead concentrate
on a durable revitalization of economic forces in DCs. Fur-
thermore, in order to avoid moral hazard, debt renegotia-
tions should not include the provision of officially subsi-
dized loans. It does not seem plausible that DCs must be
bribed in order to adopt adjustment policies that are
actually in their own best interests. If organizations like
the IMF are assumed to know better what borrowers and lend-
ers should do, they should rather act as a paid agent pro-
viding information and organizing joint action of large and
incoherent groups of creditors faced by free-rider problems
(Vaubel, 1983) .
Without considering effective policy re-orientations of
problem borrowers, it is impossible to formulate lasting
solutions. Notwithstanding that specific adjustments re-
quired will differ from country to country, the following
aspects need priority attention:
1) export activities should be vigorously promoted;
2) national currencies should be flexible enough to account
for international differences in inflation rates and to
avoid overvaluation;
3) foreign direct investment should be encouraged;
4) inflationary mentalities have to be overcome;
5) the functioning of domestic capital markets must be im-
proved or restored;
6) the waste of scarce resources, for example by unproduc-
tive state activities, should be reduced.- 21 -
- A significant part of responsibility for overcoming transfer
problems of borrowing countries rests with the creditor
countries. The latter need to revitalize their economies;
just as the DCs, the industrial countries have to bring
their houses in order and have to correct policy failures.
Most importantly, they should liberalize restrictive import
practices in order to allow for more DC-exports.
In order to sustain the functioning of the worldwide financial
system, official entities have to provide the public good of
preventing a general run of depositors on their banks that
threatens to result in an overall liquidity drain. However,
the lender-of-last-resort function of central banks must be
defined in a way which does not invite commercial banks to
rely on public guarantees in their credit decisions. That is
why it must be explicitly differentiated between the risk of
insolvency of individual banks, which pursued imprudent poli-
cies, and the risk of illiquidity of the whole system. Only
the latter should be counteracted by monetary policies. To
this end increased liquidity preferences of the public have to
be compensated for via open-market operations of central banks
and - if necessary drastically - reduced reserve requirements
for commercial banks. If the Western central banks would an-
nounce in advance that, in times of a crisis, they would fol-
low the policy just suggested, the public would be assured
that the severe failures of monetary policies in the 1930s
will not be repeated (Vaubel, 1984) . This certainty would in
turn help to further stabilize the financial system.
This view is challenged by those who argue that direct offi-
cial assistance should also be granted to troubled individual
banks, provided that they face only temporary difficulties but
can be supposed as solvent in the longer run (see, for exam-
ple, Guttentag, Herring, 1983) . To avoid moral hazard as far
as possible, it is suggested to empower public supervisory
bodies to effectively regulate the lending policies of com-
mercial banks. However, this approach is bound to fail. The
authorities would experience insurmountable difficulties to- 22 -
decide which bank deserves public help and which does not .
Moreover, an intensified public regulation of commercial
banks' lending activities is likely to result in a stalemate.
Officially imposed credit ceilings or country limits would
remain arbitrary since, as a rule, public authorities have no
better information on the risks involved than private credi-
tors.
As an alternative to public regulation, the mechanism of mar-
ket control over bank policies should be strengthened. This
requires different measures. Banks should be obliged to dis-
close more and better information as regards their credit
engagements and their exposure in problem countries. This
would provide bank depositors and shareholders with better
opportunities to control bank business. In order to equally
improve incentives to do so, insurance schemes for bank depos-
its should be limited in coverage, at least for major deposi-
tors. More disclosure can also be expected to encourage banks
to (gradually) adjust their nominal claims on borrowers to
actual market values. Particularly US-banks are lagging behind
in this respect. A more widespread use of secondary markets
for bank loans, where necessary write-offs are determined by
demand and supply, would help this process.
Notwithstanding considerable adjustment burdens inherited from
past lending to DCs, also in the coming years the commercial
banks will have to play the central role in the transfer of
financial resources from the North to the South, at- least as
regards the already advanced DCs. Official creditors cannot
substitute bank loans to any significant extent. Attempts by
creditor governments to indirectly interfere in the transfer
of private funds are likely to do more harm than good. First
It may even be argued that individual banks cannot face
liquidity problems at all,, unless there is a general liquid-
ity crisis (Sjaastad, 1983; Vaubel, 1984) . In the absence of
a general crisis, each bank can always improve its liquidity
position by selling long-term assets.- 23 -
of all, official interventions would probably fail in achiev-
ing an expansion of overall financial resources at the DCs
1
disposal. A higher grant element in official guaranty schemes
for export credits, for example, is likely to expand trade-
related loans only at the expense of other bank credits. Sec-
ondly, official interventions frequently involve considerable
social costs as they shift part of the credit risks to the
taxpayer.
Presently a lot of scepticism prevails as to whether private
banks will resume lending to DCs on a voluntary basis, when
this will take place and what amount will be involved. Actual-
ly it cannot be denied that banks are faced with considerable
uncertainties about the creditworthiness of borrowers in the
Third World. Undoubtedly it is hard to decide where the pro-
vision of fresh money is justified and profitable and where
not, especially with respect to today's problem borrowers.
Economically, throwing good money after the bad makes only
sense if debt difficulties can be expected to be overcome in a
reasonably short period. However, even in the recent past
banks did not indiscriminately refuse to continue lending.
Apart from a short period in 1982, when net lending was neg-
ative for many sound debtors too, this group of DCs experi-
enced no major difficulties in raising private funds after the
debt crisis in Latin America had broken forth; whereas for
problem borrowers net bank lending dwindled to only 20 per
cent in the period July 19 82 -• December 1983 compared to Jan-
uary 1981 - June 1982 (for further details, see Junge,
Nunnenkamp, 1984). It thus seems plausible to rely on private
financial markets (see also Campbell, 1982b). If both debtor
and creditor countries pave the way for necessary policy re-
orientations, commercial banks can be expected to fulfill
their role in providing a sufficient amount of new loans.- 24 -
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